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GETTING TO KNOW HARLAN: A NEW
APPROACH TO JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY?
THE
REPUBLIC
ACCORDING
TO
JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN. By Linda Przybyszewski. 1
University of North Carolina Press. 1999. Pp. xii, 286.
Hardcover, $49.95; Paper, $19.95.
James A. Thomson 2
Is there reason to rejoice? Clearly, there ought to be only
one answer: Yes. Although "[m]any aspects of Harlan's life and
work remain unexplored" in The Republic According to John
Marshall Harlan, 3 this apparent weakness of Professor Linda
Przybyszewski 's biography engenders pleasure, not regret.
"[A )bsence" of these details serves as "an invitation for others to
join the conversation" that this biography has "tried to begin. "4
(p. 9) In an endeavor "to try something different," (p. 9) The
Republic According to John Marshall Harlan casts aside "the dilemma of judicial biography" (p. 8) created by "the search for"
(p. 1) or "pursuit of [judicial) greatness. " 5 (p. 8) Traditionally,
1. Assistant Professor of History, University of Cincinnati.
2. LL.B (Hons) 1971, B.A. 1974, University of Western Australia; LL.M 1975,
S.J.D. 1981, Harvard University.
3. Linda Przybyszewski, The Republic According to John Marshal/Harlan 9 (U. of
North Carolina Press, 1999). For initial reviews sec Mary Frances Berry, Book Review,
87 1. Am. Hist. 1050 (2000); Tony A. Freyer, Prophet or Example, 24 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 325
(1999).
4. Other scholarship by Pncybyszewski on Harlan includes Mrs John Marshall
Harlan's Memories: Hierarchies of Gender and Race in the Household and Polity, 18 L. &
Soc. Inquiry 453 (1993); The Evolution of John Marshall Harlan the Elder, in Walter D.
Pederson and 1'\orman W. Provizcr, eds., Great Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: Ratings and Case Studies 101-23 (Peter Lang Publishing, 1993); John Marshall Harlan, in
Melvin I. Urofsky, cd., The Supreme Court Justices: A Biographical Dictionary 205-13
(Garland Publishing, 1994); Book Review, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 191 (1998); The Religion of
a Jurist: Justice David J. Brewer and the Christian Nation, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 228 (2000);

The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan: Race, Republicanism, and Citizenship
(Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1989). Sec also, Linda Przybyszewski, The Dilemma of

Judicial Biography Or Who Cares Who Is the Grear Appellate Judge? Gerald Gunther on
Learned Hand, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry 135 (1996).
5. Other biographies include Loren P. Beth, John Marshall Harlan: The Last Whig
Justice (U. Press of Kentucky, 1992); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma: The First
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two interrelated objectives have motivated judicial biographers:
to provide "models of civic behavior" (p. 206) and to prove that
the judge is great. Achieving both, Przybyszewski suggests, has
depended on how a judge performs when assessed against "five
tests" for greatness: "wisdom, economic progressivism, vindication by history, integrity, and Holmes." 6 (p. 5) However, this
"definition of greatness" (p. 8) creates rather than solves the dilemma of conventional judicial biography. The reason is obvious: greatness and its criteria are a contingent "historical artifact." (p. 8) Consequently, by confining their attention to issues
and evidence relevant to those matters, judicial biographers are
too selective in their objectives and methodologies. Inevitably,
"topics" of "importance" to the judge are "neglected." (p. 8) At
least from Przybyszewski's perspective, the traditional failure to
consider "historical circumstances" demands a new and different
approach to judicial biography. (p. 8)
Professor Przbyszewski adopts different methodologies and
objectives, as well as an "alternative" interpretation of the Civil
War's effect "on legal thought." (p. 11) This attempt to push
judicial biography into new and perhaps unexplored domains,
however, relies on familiar rather than unexpected means. Neglected source materials, for example, illuminate specific aspects
of Harlan's life and beliefs. Chronological sequencing and detailed doctrinal narratives are deliberately eschewed. Instead,
Harlan's ruminations on law and the nation as well as his nonjudicial activities are accorded greater prominence and more significance than in traditional judicial biographies. Indeed, Professor Przybyszewski's conclusions are based on the connections
between these issues and Harlan's judicial opinions. For example, Professor Przbyszewski describes Harlan's constitutional juJustice Harlan (Oxford U. Press, 1995). Revival of scholarly interest in Harlan is demonstrated by Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82
Iowa L. Rev. 151 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, The First Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just
How Great was "The Great Dissenter?," 32 Akron L. Rev. 629 (1999); Molly Townes
O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet· The Plessy Dissenter's Color-Blind
Constitution, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 753 (1998); C. Ellen Connally, Justice Harlan's
"Great Betrayal"? A Reconsideration of Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 72 (2000); David E. Bernstein, Plessy versus Lochner: The Berea
College Case, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 93 (2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining:
Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1457, 1463-1515
(2000); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes and the Passions of Justice, in Susan A.
Bandes, ed., The Passions of Law 330-62 (New York U. Press, 1999); Mark Curriden and
Leroy Phillips, Jr., Contempt of Court: The Tum-of-the-Century Lynching that Launched
ZOO Years of Federalism (Faber and Faber, Inc., 1999).
6. For further elaboration see Przybyszewski, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry at 135-52 (cited
in note 4).
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risprudence as an endeavor to preserve and protect the Union.
If this required decisions curtailing corporate power or eroding
white supremacy, Harlan delivered the necessary opinions,
though often in dissent. (pp. 2, 9, 11, 12)
Inevitably, in the presence of previous methodological contests over judicial biography,7 Professor Przybyszewski's suggested "new approach" raises an obvious question: Does The
Republic According to John Marshall Harlan succeed? Professor
Przybyszewski's alternative approach rests on three interwoven
premises. First, "primary sources" provide a basis from which
to extract interpretations and explanations of a Justice's "ideas,"
"experiences" and "transformation."8 (pp. 2, 11) Second, those
sources ought to include "nonjudicial thoughts and actions," for
example "religious faith or literary accomplishments," which are
"importan[t]," but "neglected," in judicial biographies. (pp. 2, 8,
9) Third, "[e]ach chapter" of The Republic According to John
Marshall Harlan "relies on particular primary sources that have
been neglected by other historians." (p. 9)
Repetition of one word- "neglected"- (pp. 2, 3, 8, 9, 45)
invites two questions: What are the "neglected" primary
sources? Have they in fact been "neglected"? Arguably, three
sources have been neglected: Malvina Shanklin Harlan's memoirs;9 "a verbatim transcript [of some 500 pages] of Harlan's
7. See generally J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Alpheus T. Mason and the Art of Judicial Biography, 8 Const. Comm. 41 (1991); Clyde Spillenger, Lifting the Veil: The Judicial
Biographies of Alpheus T. Mason, 21 Rev. Am. Hist. 723 (1993); G. Edward White, The
Renaissance of Judicial Biography, 23 Rev. Am. Hist. 71 (1995); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Art of Judicial Biography, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1595 (1995); Symposium: National Conference on Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 485-809 (1995); John C. Jeffries, The Athlete as Judge, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495 (1996); Stephen J. Wermel, Writing Supreme Court
Biography: A Single Lens View of a Nine-Sided Image, [1994] J. Sup. Ct. Hist 9; Laura
Kalman, The Power of Biography, 23 L. & Soc. Inquiry 479 (1998); Gerald Gunther, A
Model Judicial Biography, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2117 (1999). For debates about techniques in
other biographical scholarship see Harry Watson, Lies and Times: The Changing Genre
of Biography, 28 Rev. Am. Hist. 45 (2000); Hermione Lee, Tracking the Untrackable,
April 12, 2001, N.Y. Rev. of Books 53 (reviewing Richard Holmes, Sidetracks: Explorations of a Romantic Biographer (Pantheon, 2000)); David Ellis, Literary Lives: Biography
and the Search for Understanding (Routledge, 2000); Paul R. Backscheider, Reflections
on Biography (Oxford U. Press, 2000)).
8. For locations and descriptions of the Harlan Papers, see, e.g., Alexandra K.
Wigdor, The Personal Papers of Supreme Court Justices: A Descriptive Guide 114-17
(Garland Publishing, 1986); Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 271-72 (cited in note 5).
Some Harlan papers have been published. See, e.g., Ellwood Lewis, The Appointment of
Mr Justice Harlan, 29 Ind. L.J. 46 (1953); Alan F. Westin, The First Justice Harlan: A SelfPortrait from His Private Papers, 46 Ky. L.J. 321 (1958). This is only a fragment compared to publication of other justices' papers. Compare, e.g., G. Edward White, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self591-93 (Oxford U. Press, 1993).
9. Malvina S. Harlan, Some Memories of a Long Life, 1854-1911 (1915) (repro-
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1897-98 lectures on constitutional law" delivered at Columbian
University (subse~uently George Washington University) in
Washington, D.C.; 0 and "a list drawn up by Harlan in 1910 of
[his majority and dissenting Supreme Court] oRinions that he
wanted republished together in a single volume." 1
Mrs Harlan's memoirs are almost exclusively confined to
their nearly fifty years of marriage. As Professor Przybyszewski
clearly conveys, its narrative descriptions of their household activities and domestic arrangements reveal Justice Harlan's ubiquitous paternalism. Did that influence his civil rights positions,
including deviations from a color-blind standard? Without
equivocation, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan
provides an affirmative response. (pp. 42, 43) In contrast, two
law students' "verbatim transcript" of Harlan's lectures are an
analysis and dissection of each clause in the U.S. Constitution
and corresponding Supreme Court interpretations. (p. 44) Even
so, for Professor Przybyszewski, these recitations provide much
more: a judicial philosophy of legal formalism, a panoramic optimist's view of American history, and faith in the Constitution.
(pp. 44-72) Comparatively, Harlan's chronological list of 83 of
his judicial opinions is much sparser. Professor Przybyszewski
nevertheless treats that concise list as an invitation to engage in a
careful exegisis of each opinion and to search for a more panoduced in 26 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 109-211 (2001)). This was "a 188 page typescript autobiography." Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes:
The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 Yale L.J. 637, 642 n.l5 (1957). It is partially reproduced in Westin, 46 Ky. L.J. at 329-32 (cited in note 8). For a description, discussion
and analysis see Przybyszewski, Mrs John Marshall Harlan's Memories (cited in note 4);
Przybyszewski, Harlan at 15-43 (cited in note 3). See also id. at 29 (noting that the
Harlans were married for "almost fifty-five years").
10. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 3, 44 (cited in note 3) (referring to John Marshall
Harlan, Constitutional Law Lectures, 1897-98 (unpublished manuscript, John Marshall
Harlan Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division)). For a description, discussion
and analysis see Przybyszewski, Harlan at 44-72 (cited in note 3). Professor Przybyszewski is "preparing an edition of these lectures." The Evolution at 120 n.32 (cited in
note 4). Also at Columbian University, "Harlan began teaching domestic relations, torts,
and commercial law in 1891" but "no notes or lectures on Harlan's domestic relations
course ... seem to have survived." (pp. 85, 226 n. 24)
11. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 3 (cited in note 3); see id. at 209-11 (reproducing the
list). "The list is undated, but Harlan probably wrote it during the summer of 1910. The
last decision listed was delivered in the spring of 1910." The absence of two decisions,
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) leads Professor Przybyszewski to conclude
that Harlan drafted the list in 1910 and never revised it in 1911. Przybyszewski, Harlan at
174, 178. Professor Przybyszewski "cannot imagine that [Harlan] would have left the
Great Trust Cases of 1911 out of an accounting of his legacy to the nation." (ld. at 178)
Harlan died, in office, on Saturday, October 14, 1911. For a description, discussion and
analysis of this list, see id. at 147-87.
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ramie understanding of Harlan's "coherent legal vision." (p.
152)
It is not plausible to contend that Malvina Harlan's memoirs
have been neglected. Scholars have frequently used and reproduced them. 12 According to Professor Przybyszewski, however,
previous biographers' motivation "to prove that John (Marshall
Harlan] was a great judge" rendered that use "far less cautious."
(p. 18) Only the other sources, which Professor Przybyszewski
describes as "treasures" and "extraordinary documents," have
escaped close scholarly attention. (p. 3) Previous publications
have disclosed that Harlan gave lectures, including a constitutional law course at Columbian University. 13 Indeed, other Justices, including Story, Wilson, Miller, and Brewer, have done the
same. 14 The difference is the perspective and significance that
The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan extracts from
those lectures. 15
Much less, if any, prior attention has focused on Harlan's
list of opinions. Given this neglect and that these 83 opinions
represent a miniscule fraction of the 14,226 cases in which
Harlan participated/ 6 how and why does Przybyszewski justify
12. Sec, e.g., Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 638 (cited in note 9); David Farrelly, Harlan's
Formative Period: The Years Before the War, 46 Ky. L.J. 367 (1958).
13. See, e.g., Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme
Court Justices, 1790-1962: Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 633,
665 (1962) (listing Harlan's bibliography "Lectures on Constitutional Law, Transcript of
Law Lectures for 1897-1898, Columbian Law School"); Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at
213-15 (cited in note 5) (teaching from 1891-1910); Beth, John Marshall Harlan: The Last
Whig Justice at 144, 171 (cited in note 5) (suggesting that Harlan began teaching at Columbian Law School in 1884 and that he "taught at the summer session of the University
of Virginia Law School, and gave a series of lectures on the Constitution at Northwestern
University"); Florian Bartosic, The Constitution, Civil Liberties and John Marshall
Harlan, 46 Ky. L.J. 407,413-14 (1958).
14. See, e.g., R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of
the Old Republic 253-62 (U. North Carolina Press, 1985) (Harvard Law School lectures);
MichaelJ. Brodhead, David I. Brewer: The Life of a Supreme Court Justice, 1837-1910 at
131-32 (Southern Illinois U. Press, 1994) (Columbian University lectures); Westin at 62
Colum. L. Rev. at 648-50 (cited in note 13) (noting Justices Story, Wilson, and Baldwin's
constitutional law lectures); Przybyszewski, Harlan at 58, 252 (cited in note 3) (Miller's
lectures).
15. "Linda Carol Przybyszewski devotes considerable attention to an analvsis of
Harlan's lectures. Arguably, however, his judicial opinions offer considerably greater
insight into his judicial and constitutional philosophy." Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at
266 n.43 (cited in note 5).
16. The list is "fifty-nine majority opinions and twenty-four dissents." Przybyszcwski, Harlan at 148 (cited in note 3). For the 14,226 cases sec Alan F. Westin, Mr.
Justice Harlan, in Allison Dunham and Philip B. Kurland, cds., Mr. Justice 93, 117 (U.
Chicago Press, rev. ed. 1964). See also Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 699 n.283 (cited in note 9)
(similar figures). Compare the different total numbers of Harlan's opinions given in Bartosic, 46 Ky. L.J. at 408 (cited in note 13); Henry 1. Abraham, John Marshall Harlan: A
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this list's prominence? Harlan's perspective is paramount. Were
these 83 opinions "his favorite decisions" or do they constitute
something more: his "legacy"? (p. 147) By focusing on them,
can a biographer "understand how [Harlan] conceived of his
work on the [Supreme] Court"? (p. 148) Indeed, should significance be attributed to the appearance on this list of individual,
albeit now famous, opinions such as Plessy? (p. 148) If so, does
sheer numerical weight-the repetition of more obscure opinions dealing with the same subject matter, such as, the states' police power over "health, safety and morals"(p. 149)-mean even
more?
On each issue The Republic According to John Marshall
Harlan provides an affirmative answer. Professor Przybyszewski
relentlessly builds upon this foundation to reach three predictable conclusions. First, Harlan had "a coherent legal vision." (p.
152) Indeed, Harlan attained this coherence by simultaneously
advancing substantive due process and nationalization of the Bill
of Rights. For Harlan, free labor ideology and civil rights were
compatible, not contradictory. Second, pushed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil War, one objective was responsible for Harlan's vision: "nationalism. " 17 (p.
152) In this context, Przybyszewski suggests that Harlan's private letters provide supporting evidence. (pp. 148, 170-178)
Third, Harlan recognized and, via his list of opinions, publicly
acknowledged a disjuncture between his civil rights decisions.
For example, the Civil Rights Cases 18 and Pless/ 9 were to be
"remembered" but others, such as Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education, 20 were "failures." (p. 117)
Even if these conclusions are purely conjectural, this use of
Harlan's list, Harlan's lectures and private letters/1 and Malvina
Justice Neglected, 41 Va. L. Rev. 871, 872 (1955) (similar figures). Przybyszewski utilizes
Westin's figures and discusses one Harlan circuit court opinion. Przybyszewski, Harlan
at 76, 147, 169-70,236 n.l (cited in note 3) (discussing Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (1894)
(7th Cir.)).
17. For Harlan's changing views-from anti to pro-"the Civil War amendments"
see Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 653-63 (cited in note 9). But see Yarbrough, Judicial Enegma
at 162 (cited in note 5) (agreeing with Felix Frankfurter's view that this change was motivated to quell opposition to Harlan's Supreme Court appointment).
18. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
19. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
20. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
21. For example, Harlan notes that "only one income tax decision [Pollock v.
Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895)] is listed, but Harlan's letters tell us 1t
meant a lot to him." Przybyszewski, Harlan at 148 (cited in note 3). See also id. at 170-78
(discussing case and letters and concluding that "Ha~lan's private corresponde~ce shows
how much the Civil War had shaped his understanding of what had happened m the In-
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Harlan's memoirs leads Professor Przybyszewski to something
more. At least compared to other scholarship, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan provides different interpretations of Harlan's judicial opinions and their larger, undisclosed
motivations, reasons, and causes.
At this juncture, a more fundamental question emerges:
does Professor Przybyszewski deliver "a new approach to the
study of judges"? (p. 11) The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan may move future judicial biographies away from a
quest for greatness and toward an explanation of jurists within
their historical context and milieu. For example, Professor
Przybyszewski unabashedly elides endeavors to connect or disassociate Harlan and his "color-blind" characterization of the Constitution in Pless/2 from contemporary perspectives of Brown 23
or affirmative action. 24 In this context, speculation about what
Harlan would have done in 1996, the centenary of Plessy, is
characterized as "silly." (p. 203) The reason is obvious. Harlan
can only be understood and explained "through the historical
circumstances in which he lived. It's impossible to rip him out of
those circumstances, stick him in ours, and watch him go." (p.
203) Instead, Professor Przybyszewski uses Malvina Harlan's
memoirs to interpret what Harlan's Plessy dissent meant to him
and his Supreme Court colleagues.
Two factors are paramount: Harlan's paternalism and racism. Professor Przybyszewski believes that racism in particular
explains why Harlan, despite being prepared to enforce and espouse racial equality in relation to civil and political rights such
as travelling on public transport, jury service, and voting, (p. 97)
"hesitated" and preferred "avoiding" to do so when social rights
such as "interracial marriages or schools" were involved. (pp.
come Tax Case").
22. "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows or tolerates classes among
citizens." Plessy 163 U.S. at 559. For the origins and three different interpretations of
this sentence, see James A. Thomson, Swimming in the Air: Melville W. Fuller and the
Supreme Court 1888-1910, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 139, 168 n.191(1997). For a bibliography of
Plessy and differing interpretations of its majority and dissenting opinions, see Thomson
at 173 n.212, 177-84; Chin, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 630 n.lO (cited in note 5) (subsequent
scholarship); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L.
Rev. 881 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303; Michael J.
Klarman, Neither Hero, Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race and the Constitution in the
Twentieth Century (Chapter 1: The Plessy Era) (Oxford U. Press, forthcoming).
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. For the reversal of positions (from the 1940s to the 1990s) of liberals and
conservatives over the relationship between Plessy and Brown and between Plessy and
race-conscious affirmative action, see Thomson, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. at 168-70, 180-84
(cited in note 22).
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116, 117) Ultimately, Professor Przybyszewski maintains that
paternalism and racism solve what other Harlan biographers
leave as an unanswered puzzle: an apparently irreconcilable contradiction in Harlan's decisions and opinions between the Civil
Rights, 25 Plessy 6 and Berea College7 cases and the Pace28 and
Cummini 9 cases. (p. 116)
Whatever its other merits, Professor Przybyszewski's exposition is neither startling nor novel. This tripartite rights structure-civil, political, and social-was not unusual. 30 Its existence
has been known to other scholars. 31 Of course, Harlan, without
undermining that structural edifice,32 moved public accommodation (in the Civil Rights Cases) and transport (in Plessy) from social to civil rights?3 To that extent, Harlan can be praised as exceptional.34 However, even Professor Przybyszewski concedes
that more than this cannot be claimed:
Harlan was unwilling to make further alterations [for example, in Pace and Cumming] in the three-part system of [civil,
political, and social] rights . . . . In fact, clutching at greatness

25.
26.

109 U.S. 3 (1883) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 90-95 (cited in note 3).
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 95-99 (cited in note

3).
27. 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding, on non-constitutional grounds, Kentucky law
requiring racial segregation in private schools) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 106·
09 (cited in note 3); Bernstein, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. (cited in note 5); and Westin, 66 Yale
L.J. at 690, 708-09 (cited in note 9). But see Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 162 (cited in
note 5) (noting that Harlan's dissent expressly did not address the constitutionality of
segregation in public state schools); Charles Nesson, The Harlan-Frankfurter Connection:
An Aspect of Justice Harlan's Education, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 179, 183-85 (1991) (Felix
Frankfurter's view that Harlan would have upheld the constitutional validity of segrega·
tion in public schools).
28. 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (holding that Alabama law, which more severely punished
interracial adultery than that between same-race persons, did not contravene 14th
Amendment's equal protection clause) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 109-15
(cited in note 3).
29. 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusal to grant injunction to compel the County Board of
Education, via the denial of tax-support, to close the white public high school until the
Board reopened the black high school) discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 99-102
(cited in note 3); Connally, 25 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. (cited in note 5); and Westin, 66 Yale L.J.
at 689 (cited in note 9).
30. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 81, 84 (cited in note 3) ("Nineteenth-century white
Americans spoke of three kinds of rights: civil, political, and social" and "the common
three-part system of rights").
31. Id. at 81-85.
32. However, this might indicate that "Harlan demonstrated that ideas about rights
had a dynamism of their own." Id. at 84.
33. Id. at 84.
34. Id. at 86, 117. Others, such as "congressional Republicans like [Senator
Charles] Sumner who tried to reposition the line between social and civil rights," must
also be included. Id. at 83.
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is especially inappropriate here [in the context of Harlan's
understanding of race and its relationship to rights] because it
turns out that the beliefs that made Harlan's famous dissents
possible also underlay his less-admired decisions. 35

In addition, Professor Przybyszewski recounts "three stories" (p. 86) concerning Harlan's non judicial activities. First is
"the struggle of Harlan and his black ally Reverend Francis J.
Grirnke to prevent segregation in the [New York Avenue] Presbyterian Church [in Washington D.C.] in 1905." (p. 86) Next,
"Harlan and other white Presbyterians [attempted] to uplift and
evangelise blacks while maintaining a clear social separation
from them." (p. 87) Finally, Harlan discussed "the issue of inter-racial sexual relations" in a way which demonstrated his
"ambivalence." (p. 87) These stories, together with Malvina
Harlan's memoirs, may well reveal "how Harlan viewed the
black race and the rights it possessed." (p. 86) They also demonstrate "how Harlan's religious and legal ideas reinforced each
other. "36 (p. 86)
Unfortunately, the more important and interesting question
remains: Why did Harlan perpetuate that tripartite civil, political
and social rights structure? Why could Harlan not completely
abandon it? Professor Przybyszewski offers three versions of an
unsurprising answer. At its softest: "Racial identity would have
been lost if social equality existed." (p. 117) Next, especially
when the undertones of white Protestant superiority are heard, is
its more strident intonation: Harlan's "belief in an Anglo-Saxon
heritage." (p. 116) Finally and bluntly the clear answer
emerges: "Harlan's racialism." (p. 116) Of course, as Professor
Przybyszewski recognizes this racialism not only "made
[Harlan's] egalitarianism possible," but it "also accounts for the
inconsistencies in his civil rights decisions." (p. 116) That is,
"Harlan's racialism" was simultaneously liberating and constraining. "[W]hite paternalism and Anglo-Saxon racial identity
both justified his famous dissents and limited his definition of
civil rights." (p. 118) However, even for Harlan there was no
liberating element for Native Americans or Chinese. 37
35. Id. at 85.
36. At least one other scholar has suggested that Harlan "allegedly went to sleep
with one hand upon the Constitution and the other on the Bible, and thus secured the
untroubled sleep of the just and the righteous." G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 129 (footnote omitted) (Oxford U.
Press, 1988 expanded ed.).
37. See Przybyszewski, Harlan at 118-22 (cited in note 3); Chin, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at
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Indeed, these conclusions- Harlan's limited application of
civil and political equality only to public accommodation and
transport and private schools but not to public schools or interracial adultery and his racism-resonate with other scholars'
conclusions. 38 Starkly, however, they almost reverse conclusions
promulgated by earlier scholars who sought to revive Harlan's
reputation. Under a sub-headinf- "The Psychological Bases of
Harlan's Civil Rights Opinions" 3 -is one example: 40
Just why Harlan gave such undeviating support to Negro civil
rights is worth probing .... [H)e ... became the most fervent
Republican of them all [because] ... the Negro was not a minor or occasional theme in his life; it had run like a leitmotif
through his Kentucky career ....
When Harlan joined the Court in 1877 ... he arrived as a
man whose most vivid experience apart from battle had been
his conversion on the civil rights issue. To justify his basic
shift in philosophy in 1868, Harlan had to convince himself
that he had been wrong-completely and dangerously
wrong-in his earlier pro-slavery views.... [J]ust as a religious or political convert will hold his faith more strongly,
even more combatively, than the born believer, so Justice
Harlan had become a staunch supporter of Negro civil
rights . . . . In addition ... Harlan came to associate his warm
personal memories of the Civil War with the cause of the Negro.... [Harlan) assimilate[d) his attitude toward Negroes
into the moral and political fundamentalism that was his basic
framework. 41

In the context of this transformation thesis, 42 one effect of
Professor Przybyszewski's conclusions is obvious: Harlan's personal "civil rights odyssey" 43 - from slavery apologist to "staunch
supporter of Negro civil rights" 44 -cannot be sustained. 45 Again,
151 (cited in note 5); Chin, 32 Akron L. Rev. at 629 (cited in note 5). But sec Abraham,
41 Va. L. Rev. at 880-81 (cited in note 16) (Harlan "had come to feel genuine concern for
the plight of the Negro, a concern that he continually echoed for other minorities as well,
such as the Chinese and the American Indians") (footnotes omitted); Henry J. Abraham,
John Marshall Harlan: The Justice and the Man, 46 Ky. L.J. 448,466 (1958) (same).
38. Sec, e.g., Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma at 160-62 (cited in note 5); Chin, 32 Akron L. Rev. (cited in note 5).
39. Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 697 (cited in note 9).
40. See also Abraham, 41 Va. L. Rev. at 880-86 (cited in note 16); Abraham, 46 Ky.
L.J. at 465-70 (cited in note 37).
41. Westin, 66 Yale L.J. at 697-99 (cited in note 9).
42. Note the title of Westin, 66 Yale L.J. (cited in note 9).
43. Id. at 638.
44. Id. at 698.
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it is not uncommon for biographers to promulgate a transformation thesis which other scholars endeavor to refute. Classic examples in this genre include biographies of Justices Holmes and
Frankfurter and Chief Justice Warren. 46 Of course, moving from
one position to another, even if it involves being inconsistent,
can often be a virtue, rather than a vice.
The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan is not confined to blacks' civil rights. Rather, Professor Przybyszewski
uses Harlan's lectures, letters, extra-judicial speeches, and list of
cases to analyze, probe, and provide interpretations and conclusions over an extensive domain of public life and law. Seminal
cases are obvious: Lochner, 47 the Insular cases,48 and the Income
Tax cases.49 Professor Przybyszewski also discusses Smyth v.
Ames;50 Hurtado v. People of California; 51 and Robertson v.
Baldwin. 51 Again, Harlan is placed within, not extrapolated
from, his surrounding historical context: "Even Harlan's criticism of corporate power was couched in free labor ideology.
The Whig turned Republican had learned his lessons well ....
45. Harlan (cited in note 3) repudiates the latter, rather than the earlier, part of the
thesis.
46. See, e.g., White, Holmes: Law and the Inner Self at 450-53 (cited in note 8);
Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties (Twayne
Publishers, 1991); James A. Thomson, Capturing the Future: Earl Warren and Supreme
Court History, 32 Tulsa L.J. 843, 873-74 (1997); Michael E. Parrish, Earl Warren and the
American Judicial Tradition, 1982 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 1179. For dangers inherent in
this genre see Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half" The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 921, 926-30 (2001) (critiquing scholarship which promulgates novel or counterintuitive ideas).
47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 149-52 (cited in note
3). See generally Thomson, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. at 174 n.212, 185-90 (cited in note 22) (bibliography and various interpretations).
48. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
Discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 123-46 (cited in note 3). See generally James E.
Kerr, The Insular Cases: The Role of the Judiciary in American Expansionism (Kennikat
Press, 1982).
49. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Discussed in Przybyszewski,
Harlan at 170-73, 177-78 (cited in note 3). See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief
Justiceship of Melville W. Fuller 1888-1910 at 118-23 (U. South Carolina Press, 1995).
50. 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (Harlan's substantive due process fair-value formula to assess the reasonableness of railroad rates set by states or state agencies).
51. 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Harlan's dissent using 14th Amendment's due process
clause to apply Bill of Rights to the states). Discussed in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 16266 (cited in note 3 ).
52. 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (Harlan's dissent uses the 13th Amendment in relation to a
sailor who had deserted and was returned by a U.S. marshal to the ship). Discussed in
Przybyszewski, Harlan at 169 (cited in note 3). See generally Yarbrough,Judicial Enigma
at 156-57, 227 (cited in note 5).
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Like many Americans of his generation, Harlan retained a simplified view of economic class even as others were complicating
their views. There were people who worked and people who
lived off their investments (which they were likely to have acquired in some underhand way)." 53
That leads Professor Przybyszewski to an inevitable and unsurprising conclusion:
Instead of trying to identify Harlan as a man who transcended history and was later vindicated by it, [The Republic
According to John Marshall Harlan] has tried to show that he
was a man with a history . . . . Harlan drew on the traditions
in which he was raised, struggled through his own experiences, and came to an explanation of what had happened and
what would happen to himself and his country ....
Judicial biographers' desire to prove that they are writing
about great judges was inspired in part by the oldest justification for biography: the attempt to supply models of civic behavior....
[The Republic According to John Marshall
Harlan] offer[s] Harlan's history less as a model and more as
evidence of the importance of the individual choices made by
those participating in the republican project. 54

Ironically, Harlan would have rebuffed Professor Przybyszewski's new approach to judicial biography. Harlan was aspiring to greatness. On November 20, 1897, he explained to his
constitutional law class:
I cannot tell, except from the feeling of the ambition that is
planted in the breast of every man to live after he is dead and
gone in the memory of his fellow citizens ... I can understand
why a man may be willing to give his whole life, and lead a life
of poverty and self-denial if by doing so he can make a great
name in his country. 55

Immediately after quoting that statement, Professor Przybyszewski succinctly summarizes Harlan's position: "By serving
the Union, a man could achieve civic immortality." (p. 190) Not
recognized or commented upon is an obvious implication:
Harlan, unlike Professor Przybyszewski, would have supported

53. Przybyszewski, Harlan at 184 (cited in note 3) (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 206-07.
55. Harlan, Constitutional Law Lectures (cited in note 10) (quoted in Przybyszewski, Harlan at 190 (cited in note 3)).
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and advocated biographies seeking and extolling greatness in
judges.
Especially because it confronts the strength and longevity of
traditional approaches, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan is a bold and courageous undertaking. Whether it
will or should accomplish Professor Przybyszewski's larger objective-the transformation from traditional to new biographical
approaches-is much more debatable. Fortunately, however,
this is not an aU-or-nothing proposition. Hopefully, as Professor
Przybyszewski envisages, at least a "conversation" (p. 9) will ensue. If that leads to better judicial biographies, much will have
been achieved. 56

56. For a suggestion that this may have already occurred within the parameters of
Professor Przybyszewski's biographical scholarship see Wildenthal, 61 Ohio St. L.J. at
1464-65 n.40 (cited in note 5) (concluding that Przybyszewski, Harlan (cited in note 3) "is
one of the most intriguing and inspiring accounts ever written on the formation and expression of any judge's legal philosophy and work product" but "[bjecause [that] book
substantially modifies [Przybyszewski, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan
(cited in note 4)] in certain ways, [Professor Wildenthal] ... cite[s] to both [that] book
and that [Ph.D.] dissertation, as appropriate").

